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ABSTRACT 
In this thesis, I analyze how civil-military relations in the PRC have evolved during 
previous efforts to professionalize the military and examine the implications on 
contemporary analysis of civil-military relations.  Current approaches to understanding 
civil-military relations in the PRC have focused on the professionalization of the military.  
However, lessons learned from similar episodes of professionalization in the PLA’s past 
have not been fully incorporated into the current analyses. 
 I develop two case studies chosen at times when there was a prominent shift in the 
relationship between the CCP and PLA that negatively affected the push toward increased 
professionalization of the military.  The first case study traces the growth and reversal to 
professionalization in the late 1950s while the second case study follows the 
professionalization trend through the 1980s and its dramatic reversal in the aftermath of 
the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident.  By comparing the key linkages between the CCP 
and PLA that allowed for the previous reversals of professionalization in the military, I 
highlight the consistencies among the different episodes in the PRC's civil-military 
history.  Lastly, I expand on the implication of these findings on contemporary civil-
military relations and its potential impact on current professionalization of the PLA. 
 
 vi 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION................................................................1 
B. IMPORTANCE ................................................................................................1 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES ...............................................................3 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW ...............................................................................5 
1. 1959–1969 Factionalism.......................................................................7 
2. 1949–1997: Symbiosis—the “Interlocking Directorate” ..................7 
3. 1950–1958, 1985–1989, 1992–2010: Professionalism ........................8 
4. 1985–2010: Party Control ...................................................................9 
5. 1999–2010: Conditional Compliance and State Control ................10 
6. Attempts at Comparative Studies.....................................................10 
7. Huntington Revisited .........................................................................11 
8. Conclusion ..........................................................................................12 
E. METHODS AND SOURCES........................................................................13 
F. OVERVIEW ...................................................................................................13 
II. CASE STUDY I: 1959 ...............................................................................................15 
A. OVERVIEW ...................................................................................................15 
B. PROFESSIONALIZATION .........................................................................16 
1. The Korean War ................................................................................17 
2. Continuing Professionalization .........................................................20 
C. EMERGENCE OF FACTIONS ...................................................................20 
D. PROFESSIONALIZATION AFFECTING POLITICIZATION .............21 
E. EXTERNAL FACTORS ...............................................................................23 
1. Great Leap Forward ..........................................................................23 
2. Sino-Soviet Tensions ..........................................................................23 
F. REVERSAL OF PROFESSIONALIZATION ............................................24 
1. Expanding the Militia ........................................................................25 
2. Interlocking Directorate ....................................................................26 
3. Role of the GPD ..................................................................................28 
4. PLA Training and Education ...........................................................30 
III. CASE STUDY II: 1989 ..............................................................................................33 
A. OVERVIEW ...................................................................................................33 
B. PROFESSIONALIZATION .........................................................................34 
C. EMERGENCE OF FACTIONS ...................................................................36 
D. PROFESSIONALIZATION AFFECTING POLITICIZATION .............37 
E. EXTERNAL FACTORS ...............................................................................39 
F. REVERSAL OF PROFESSIONALIZATION ............................................40 
1. Interlocking Directorate ....................................................................41 
2. Role of the GPD ..................................................................................44 
3. PLA Training and Education ...........................................................46 
 viii 
IV. CONCLUSION ..........................................................................................................49 
A. SUMMARY ....................................................................................................49 
B. PROFESSIONALIZATION .........................................................................50 
C. IMPLICATIONS ...........................................................................................52 
LIST OF REFERENCES ......................................................................................................55 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .........................................................................................61 
 
 ix 
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
CCP   Chinese Communist Party 
CPV   Chinese People's Volunteers 
DIC   Discipline Inspection Commission 
GLF   Great Leap Forward 
GPD   General Political Department 
NDL   National Defense Law 
PLA   People's Liberation Army 
PRC   People's Republic of China 
 x 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xi 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
This project would not have been possible without the untiring support of my wife 
and our two amazing children. 
 xii 




A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
Since the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) have 
developed a unique relationship that has evolved over time.  From 1949 to present day, 
the relationship between the Party and Army has evolved from one in which the CCP and 
PLA were nearly indistinguishable to a relationship that appears much more aligned to 
the division between the civilian-run state and professional military found in the West.  
While much attention has been directed at examining the dynamic relationship between 
the CCP and the PLA under the broad topic of civil-military relations, there has been 
limited effort in establishing the way in which civil-military relations have evolved in the 
PRC. 
This thesis assesses how civil-military relations in the PRC have evolved during 
previous efforts to professionalize the military and examine the implications for 
contemporary civil-military relations.  As discussed in the following literature review, the 
current approaches of “conditional compliance” and “state control” rely heavily on the 
role of professionalization of the military to conceptualize current civil-military relations.  
However, lessons learned from similar episodes of professionalization in the PLA’s past 
have not been fully incorporated into current analyses of civil-military relations.  The 
goal of this thesis is not to replace the current approaches to understanding civil-military 
relations, but to refine and potentially constrain the inputs of professionalization on the 
“conditional compliance” and “state control” approaches. 
B. IMPORTANCE  
In general, a great deal of academic research has been directed at China over the 
last three decades as the rapid economic, social, and military growth has placed China 
firmly among the major players in the international community.  This sustained economic 
growth, which enabled China to surpass Japan in the summer of 2010 to become the 
world's second largest economy, has fueled a military modernization effort that may have 
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recently initiated the first test-flight for China's indigenously produced 5th generation 
fighter aircraft in January 2011 and sea trial tests on the PLAN's first aircraft carrier.1  As 
civilian authorities and the PLA evolve with the changes, it is important to understand 
how their relationship has changed to get at the fundamental question of whether the new 
civil-military relations are stable.2 
While these advances have gained attention on their own merit, the assertive 
actions off the Chinese coast in the South and East China Seas have amplified the interest 
in military affairs in China.  Furthermore, significant events such as the 1989 Tiananmen 
Square incident, the emergency landing of a U.S. EP-3 on Hainan in 1991, the Taiwan 
crisis of 1995–1996, the outbreak of SARS in 2002, and the J-20 test flight have all 
sparked academic probes into the relationship between civilian and military authority in 
the PRC.  The goal in these studies has been to determine whether "the degree of civil-
military cooperation and the level of civil-military conflict over foreign policy may have 
major implications for China's strategic behavior."3 
Specific periods of civil-military relations over the course of the PRC's history 
have been extensively studied.  While a consensus has not been reached over the exact 
nature of how civil-military relations have evolved, there is a recent trend in the literature 
that acknowledges and stresses the increasing levels of professionalization within the 
PLA.  However, the challenge facing analysts of Chinese civil-military relations is to 
draw out the implications that the current trend towards higher levels of 
professionalization has had, or will have, on civil-military relations.  This thesis 
contributes to current understanding by looking at the constraints that may limit the 
degree of professionalism in the context of current trends in China's civil-military 
relations. 
Previous efforts to professionalize the PLA have been limited or interrupted for a 
variety of reasons.  By looking at how the civilian-military relationship in China has 
                                                 
1 BBC News, "China's First Aircraft Carrier ‘Starts Sea Trials.'" BBC News Asia-Pacific, 10 August 
2011, www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-14470882. Accessed 12 November 2011. 
2 Nan Li, Chinese Civil-Military Relations: The Transformation of the People's Liberation Army (New 
York: Routledge, 2006), 1. 
3 Ibid. 
 3 
evolved since 1949, this research exposes the mechanisms embedded in the CCP and the 
PLA organization that have allowed the CCP to alter the civil-military relationship while 
also disrupting attempts at professionalization.  Therefore, if the same mechanism that 
has limited professionalism in the past persists in the current organization, it remains 
possible that the PLA’s capacity to professionalize may become limited. 
The current trend in contemporary studies of civil-military relations in China has 
increasingly focused on the enhanced role of the state, increased institutionalization, and 
the effects of professionalization.  This research looks to ensure that past events are not 
inadvertently overlooked, without critical examination, in relation to the attention 
afforded to contemporary trends.  It remains possible that the connection will fail to 
correlate strongly with civil-military relations in China today.  But the aim is to recognize 
the significant and relevant events of China's past when trying to understand whether 
fundamental changes to the civilian-military relationship are underway in China. 
Peter Feaver casts the challenge of civilian-military relations as a balance between 
control and effectiveness. The goal is to achieve "a military strong enough to do anything 
the civilians ask them to do with a military subordinate enough to do only what civilians 
authorize them to do."4 Thus, the implications of this research extend to the endeavors of 
PLA analysts to understand the upper limits of military professionalization of the PLA in 
a China dominated by the CCP.  
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
Studies of the PLA since the establishment of the PRC encounter the general 
challenge of gaining access to information.  The main challenge is the general 
inaccessibility of primary sources due to availability and language difficulties.  Because 
of the isolation of China from the West in the PRC’s early decades, relatively little first-
hand information was available.  As China opened to the West in recent decades, 
information has become increasingly available, but the lack of transparency with regard  
 
 
                                                 
4 Peter D. Feaver, "The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz and the Question of 
Civilian Control." Armed Forces & Society 23 no 2 (Winter 1996): 149. 
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to political and military changes continues to challenge China analysts’ ability to arrive at 
concrete conclusions.  Therefore, studies of the PLA and CCP have had consistently to 
qualify their arguments with the proviso that more information is needed. 
A separate challenge related to the relative lack of information available is that 
analysts have been left to infer connections through basic observations.  As a result it is 
common for scholars to form different conclusions by looking at much of the same 
evidence, as confirmed by the variety of analysis available on the political motivations of 
the CCP as well as the intentions and capabilities of the PLA.  As covered in the literature 
review, scholarly approaches have also varied widely in assessing the nature of China's 
civil-military relations.  Thus, it is of primary importance to critically select the sources 
used for this study and maintain a healthy awareness for ambiguities among explanations. 
Another issue is the variety of terms used in the literature on civil-military 
relations in general and on the unique nature of the relationship in China in particular.  
Each term is associated with distinct interpretations of the civil-military relationship and 
it is important to remember that they are not interchangeable.  To avoid confusion, this 
thesis uses the term civil-military relationship to capture the general interaction of 
authorities within the CCP who are primarily civilian with those individuals in the PLA 
who are mostly military oriented.  This thesis's use of civil-military terms found in the 
literature that relate to the conceptual approaches of civil-military relationships retains 
the features and characteristics previously developed by other scholars as presented in the 
literature review. 
In looking at how civil-military relations have changed in the past, this thesis 
identifies the mechanisms and linkages through which civil-military relations have 
changed in China and explain the effect that this change has had on previous efforts to 
professionalize the PLA.  Case studies of major junctures in civil-military relations in the 
history of the PRC, such as the dynamic events before, during and after the Great Leap 
Forward and the transformation that occurred in the aftermath of the 1989 Tiananmen 
Crisis, reveal the mechanisms through which the changes in civil-military relations were 
achieved.  Because the function of the General Political Department (GPD) of the PLA 
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has been to act as an intermediary between the CCP to PLA, each case study examines 
the role that this institution has played.  Furthermore, the changes in China’s civil-
military relationship that have coincided with reversals in the efforts to professionalize 
the military carry implications for the current effort to professionalize a PLA that retains 
the GPD as one of its major branches.  
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
While a variety of analytical approaches have been developed to understand civil-
military relations in China, the origins for the study of civil-military relations are 
grounded in Samuel Huntington’s book, The Soldier and the State. 5   In this book, 
Huntington develops several conceptual tools for use in the study of civil-military 
relations.  However some of the concepts, such as the distinction between “subjective” 
and “objective civilian control” of the military, lack explanatory capability when 
examining China due to the unique political origins of the PLA.  His definition of 
professionalism, however, has been widely accepted.  Finally, Huntington's distinction 
between “subjective” and “objective” types of civilian control may not accurately capture 
the relationship between the PLA and the CCP in the past, but it may once again become 
relevant as the PLA has become increasingly subject to laws and regulations. 
In The Soldier and the State, Huntington understands civilian supremacy over the 
military as either "subjective" or "objective civilian control."  While subjective civilian 
control subordinates the military through indoctrination that encourages a unity of 
thought between society and the military, objective civilian control relies on the 
professionalization of the military to ensure the separation between civilian and military 
authority.  Huntington believes that civil-military relations of every state may be 
described by employing this distinction.  Leninist states such as China, Taiwan (prior to 
democratization), the Soviet Union, and Vietnam clearly fall under the subjective civilian 
control group, while liberal democracies, such as the United States, France, and the 
United Kingdom exemplify objective civilian control.6 
                                                 
5 Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations 
(Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1957). 
6 Ibid., 80–97. 
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The assumption in drawing separate categories of civilian control over the 
military is conceptually challenging to reconcile with the closely linked relationship 
between the CCP and PLA historically.  Civil-military relations in the PRC closely 
parallel those in the former Soviet Union and employ many of the same control 
mechanisms, such as ideological persuasion and a political commissar system.  However, 
unlike the Soviet Union, the Party and army in China have been inextricably linked 
through the civil war and more importantly upon the founding of the country in 1949. 
Scholars of civil-military relations in China recognize Huntington's contribution to the 
study of the PLA, but they have sought to re-conceptualize or adapt the category of 
subjective civilian control to apprehend more accurately the evolution of civil-military 
relations in the PRC since 1949.7  
Recognizing China's unique relationship between the PLA and the CCP, the 
literature addressing civil-military relations in China includes several attempts to 
formulate theoretical approaches to understand these relations in China distinct from the 
broader study of civil-military relations founded by Huntington and debated by Janowitz, 
Moskos, and Feaver.8  In general, Chinese civil-military relations have been understood 
in approaches focusing on factions, symbiosis, professionalism, party control, conditional 
compliance, and state control.9   The relative importance of each model depends on the 
specific segment of time analyzed in the history of the PRC.  What emerges from the 
literature review is a story of evolving civil-military affairs, with the importance of the  
 
 
                                                 
7 Harlan Jencks, From Muskets to Missiles: Politics and Professionalism in the Chinese Army, 1945–
1981 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1982); Ellis Joffe, Party and Army: Professionalism and Political 
Control in the Chinese Officer Corps, 1949–1964 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987); Paul 
Godwin, "Professionalism and Politics in the Chinese Armed Forces: A Reconceptualization," in Civil-
Military Relations in Communist Systems, ed. Dale R. Herspring and Ivan Volgyes (Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press, 1978); and David Shambaugh, Modernizing China's Military: Progress, Problems, and 
Prospects (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2002). 
8 Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 
1960); Charles C. Moskos, "From Institution to Occupation: Trends in Military Organization," Armed 
Forces & Society 4 no 1(1977): 41–50; and Feaver, "The Civil-Military Problematique,” 149–178. 
9 Michael Kiselycznyk and Phillip C. Saunders, "Civil-Military Relations in China: Assessing the 
PLA's Role in Elite Politics," Institute for National Strategic Studies, China Strategic Perspectives 2 
(August 2010): 1. 
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various approaches fluctuating in relation to events and to available information.  While 
each model may be employed across PRC history, the following literature review 
synthesizes the approaches with relevant periods. 
1. 1959–1969 Factionalism 
A factionalism approach, most notably argued by Monte Bullard, analyzes the 
interaction and competition among political factions within the elite of the CCP and 
PLA.10  While factions dominated the political landscape during significant events in 
PRC history such as the Great Leap Forward, the Cultural Revolution, and the power 
transition upon the death of Mao Zedong, it has become less useful as generational 
change has replaced the political and military elite.  Following Michael Swaine's 
investigation of elite power relations, a crippling challenge to the factional model 
emerged as the effects of professionalism fundamentally changed Chinese civil-military 
relations.11  However, as recently as 2005, Swaine retained and successfully utilized a 
portion of the factional model in his analysis of civil-military relations in the context of 
the 2003 SARS outbreak.12   
2. 1949–1997: Symbiosis—the “Interlocking Directorate” 
Understanding party-army relations as a fusion of the civilian and military elites 
has also been strongly advocated in the literature.  David Shambaugh's model of a 
dynamic symbiosis has been the most successful example of characterizing the various 
interwoven relations between the PLA and CCP since 1949.  While he observes a 
struggle for control and increased autonomy between the CCP and the PLA, the essential 
symbiotic relationship of an "interlocking directorate" and political indoctrination has 
                                                 
10 Monte Bullard, China's Political-Military Evolution: The Party and the Military in the PRC, 1960–
1984 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985). 
11 Li Cheng and Lynn White, "The Army in the Succession to Deng Xiaoping: Familiar Fealties and 
Technocratic Trends," Asian Survey 33 no 8 (August 1993): 757–761. 
12 Michael Swaine, “Civil-Military Relations and Domestic Power and Policies” (paper presented at the 
Conference on “Chinese Leadership, Politics, and Policy,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
Washington D.C., November 2, 2005), 10–11. 
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remained largely intact until the mid-1990s.13  At this point, Shambaugh notes that the 
significant changes in China’s civil-military relationship as a result of the bifurcation 
among elites and increased professionalization has fundamentally raised questions about 
the symbiosis of party and army and introduced the state into the power struggle in PRC 
politics.14  Citing the importance of the introduction of the National Defense Law (NDL) 
in 1997 and subsequent 1998 Defense White Paper, Shambaugh suggests that the military 
is increasingly being placed under state control.15  Similarly, Andrew Scobell strongly 
endorses the new party-state-army dynamic.16  However, the NDL has mostly muddled 
the picture of civilian and military relations in China because of its various references to 
both state and party control of the military.  This, Shambaugh argues, has affected the 
symbiotic relationship of the party and army, but has not yet replaced it as an essential 
connection between the party and army. 17 
3. 1950–1958, 1985–1989, 1992–2010: Professionalism 
The professionalism model has been advanced in the early works of Ellis Joffe, 
Harlan Jencks, and Paul Godwin and remains particularly relevant in the literature on 
current civil-military relations in China.18  During periods of modernization in the mid-
1950s and the reforms initiated under Deng Xiaoping, professionalism has been 
emphasized in the PLA.19  While this effort has not achieved the level of professionalism 
that Huntington envisioned, professionalism intertwined with various levels of 
politicization has been evidenced in the PLA's behavior in seeking autonomy and 
                                                 
13 David Shambaugh, "Civil-Military Relations in China: Party-Army or National Military?" 
Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies 16 (2002): 11. 
14 Shambaugh, "Civil-Military Relations in China," 10–11. 
15 Ibid., 22–23. 
16 Andrew Scobell, "China's Evolving Civil-Military Relations: Creeping Guojiahua," Armed Forces & 
Society 31 no 2 (Winter 2005): 227–244. 
17 Shambaugh, "Civil-Military Relations in China," 25. 
18 Joffe, Party and Army; Jencks, From Muskets to Missiles; Godwin, "Professionalism and Politics in 
the Chinese Armed Forces;” and Godwin, Development of the Chinese Armed Forces (Maxwell Airforce 
Base, Alabama: Air University Press, 1988).  
19 There was a brief, but significant interruption to civil-military relations and a reversal in the 
professionalization in favor of increased politicization of the PLA following the events in Tiananmen 
Square. 
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disengagement from "quasi-civilian responsibilities." 20   Joffe’s analysis of the  
relationship between the CCP and PLA from 1949–1964 emphasized conflict emerging 
between the professional motivations of the military and the Party's traditional political 
orientation and the use of the PLA in non-military operations. 21   Over time, the 
professionalism framework lost explanatory power among PLA analysts in analyzing 
civil-military relations.  By 1996, Joffe began incorporating the symbiosis and the party 
control models as supplementary approaches to better understand the evolving nature of 
civil-military relations. "Party-army relations in China have been marked by 
contradictory characteristics,” Joffe noted.22  Depending on the specific instance beign 
analyzed, certain characteristics of civil-military relations are better characterized by the 
professionalization approach, but other aspects were more accurately captured in the 
symbiosis approach.  Thus Joffe concludes that civil-military relations are in tension, and 
that elements of professionals and symbiosis are useful in understanding relations 
between the Party and the army.  This powerful observation offers a useful perspective, 
suggesting that the main characteristics of more than one model may overlap rather than 
operate to the exclusion of each other. 
4. 1985–2010: Party Control 
Efforts to analyze civil-military relations through looking at mechanisms of party 
control over the military are also reflected in the literature.  Notable efforts, such as that 
by Nan Li, have investigated the organizational changes within the PLA that serve as the 
foundation for party control. 23   Shambaugh has also employed aspects of the party 
control model to explain the gradual transformation from party-army relations that were 
strongly symbiotic during the revolutionary struggle and the early years of the PRC to 
one which remained symbiotic, but became increasingly characterized by party control of 
the PLA.   
                                                 
20 Jencks, From Muskets to Missiles, 178. 
21 Joffe, Party and Army, 1949–1964, 149.  
22 Ellis Joffe, "Party-Army Relations in China: Retrospect and Prospect," The China Quarterly 146 
(June 1996): 300. 
23 Nan Li, "Organizational Changes of the PLA, 1985–1997," The China Quarterly 158 (June 1999): 
314–317. 
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5. 1999–2010: Conditional Compliance and State Control 
The two contemporary approaches that capture the most recent characteristics of 
China's civil-military relations are termed "conditional compliance" and "state control."  
The conditional compliance approach, developed by James Mulvenon and You Ji, 
emerged to explain the current civil-military relationship in China as a more equal 
relationship in which bargaining and "interest sharing" have emerged as major variables 
alongside professionalism.24  Therefore, as the state institutions continue to expand and 
develop patterns among them, bureaucratic models of analysis may become increasingly 
useful.  The state control model advanced in more recent works by Shambaugh and 
Scobell emphasizes the increased legislation and regulation that governs the PLA.  
Arguing that there has been a complete bifurcation of the elite regarding positional and 
personal ties between the party and the army combined with the increased autonomy of 
the PLA as a result of increased professionalization, the linkage between party and army 
has been weakened.  In conjunction with the major changes espoused in the 1997 
National Defense Law and the proliferation of military regulations, the state control 
model introduces the PRC state as a major factor in China’s civil-military relations and 
envisions that a three-way power struggle is underway in contemporary China.25 
6. Attempts at Comparative Studies 
Because of the political structure of Leninist party-states in which single party 
control permeates all of government, comparative studies have been limited to Taiwan, 
Latin America and former communist states in Eastern Europe.26  While comparative 
studies have achieved inconclusive results, these efforts have proven useful for some 
periods in China's political evolution.  However, democratization in Taiwan and the end 
of the Cold War have severely limited the applicability of these studies to civil-military 
                                                 
24 You Ji, “Hu Jintao’s Consolidation of Power and His Command of the Gun,” in China into the Hu-
Wen Era: Policy Initiatives and Challenges, ed. John Wong and Lai Hongyi (Singapore: World Scientific, 
2006), 44–45. 
25 Shambaugh, "Civil-Military Relations in China," 22–23; and Scobell, "China's Evolving Civil-
Military Relations," 227–244. 
26 Hsiao-shih Cheng, Party-Military Relations in the PRC and Taiwan (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 
1990). 
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relations in China.  Unlike Taiwan, there is little indication of a process of true 
democratization occurring within China.27  And while studies of civil-military relations 
in other communist states of Herspring and Volges, Adelman, and Currie provide insight 
at aspects of China's civil-military relations, the significant changes since the end of the 
Cold War limit their utility to understanding only particular periods in the evolution of 
civil-military relations in China. 28   Not only have the former communist states 
dramatically changed since 1989, but political changes in China also contributed to the 
decline in the usefulness of older comparative studies.  As the "dual-role elite" has 
gradually deteriorated in China as a result of the generational change in leadership and 
the development of separate career paths, a clearer distinction between the ruling party 
elite and military elite has become more apparent.29 
7. Huntington Revisited 
The political evolution in China has also re-invigorated interest in the work of 
Huntington as his definition of professionalism has become widely employed in the 
literature addressing civil-military relations in China.  While using professionalism to 
explain the degree of involvement of the military in civilian politics has been displaced 
by other variables such as "changes in the government's political legitimacy, level of 
economic development, state capacity, and the international normative and material 
structures," Huntington's definition of profession as distinct from vocation has enjoyed a 
resurgence in the study of civil-military relations in China. 30   As analysts of PLA 
developments have followed recent developments in PLA modernization and 
professionalization, Huntington's definition of professionalism in terms of expertise, 
responsibility and corporateness has been widely cited. 
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However, Huntington's assertion that professionalism results in a depoliticized 
military is not without critics.  A distinct challenge is found in Alfred Stepan's re-
conceptualization of the nature of expertise in modern militaries.31  Developing countries, 
such as those in Latin America and Southeast Asia have relied heavily on the military to 
govern at times when the state apparatus was too weak to govern.  Examples such as 
Suharto in Indonesia, the multiple military coups in Thailand, and the military junta that 
came to power in Myanmar in 1962 testify to the unique role of a professional military in 
developing countries.  Thus, Stepan’s argument can be extended beyond Latin America 
when expanding the definition of modern professionalization in the military to include an 
element of politicization in addition to the management of violence on behalf of the state.  
In essence, internal security and national development have also been incorporated into 
the conception of the modern military profession.32   
8. Conclusion 
 In summary, while the study of civil-military relations in China is grounded in the 
work of Samuel Huntington, his conceptions of "subjective" and "objective civilian 
control" of the military have been altered to fit the reality of China's unique history.  
Nevertheless, his definition of professionalism has been widely used in the analysis of 
civil-military relations in China.  
A consensus has emerged among the most persuasive studies that the relationship 
between the CCP and PLA has evolved over time.  However, conceptualizing the exact 
nature of the relationship has remained contentious as seen in the variety of approaches in 
the literature.  Part of the issue is the dynamic nature of both the politics of the CCP and 
the various functions that the PLA has performed in the PRC since 1949.  This review 
has sought to consolidate the various positions in an inclusive fashion in order to 
highlight the specific model that best portrays the party-army relationship at specific 
periods in the evolution in China's civil-military relations. 
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E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
The goal of this thesis is to develop an approach that maintains some continuing 
relevance to analysis of civil-military affairs in China today and in the future.  Thus, the 
method of research for this thesis will proceed through the development of two case 
studies chosen at times when there was a prominent shift in the relationship between the 
CCP and PLA that negatively affected the push toward increased professionalization of 
the military.  Furthermore, these case studies have been selected from different times to 
reflect different civil-military relationships since the establishment of the PRC.  
Therefore, the case studies develop continuities in analyzing how the civil-military 
relationship not only evolved, but countered trends towards professionalization. 
This thesis rests principally on secondary sources.  In addition to the work of the 
scholars covered in the literature review, secondary sources have also been consulted for 
each case study to ensure that the case study events are accurately summarized. 
F. OVERVIEW 
This first chapter has posted the general thesis question and sketched the relevant 
literature.  The subsequent two chapters develop the case studies, detailing the dynamic 
political and military developments in each instance. A concluding chapter summarizes 
the similarities and contrasts between the case studies in order to extrapolate pertinent 
lessons that may be carried forward to understand current and future developments in 
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II. CASE STUDY I: 1959 
A. OVERVIEW 
 The first turning point in civil-military relations in the PRC to be considered 
centered on the removal of Peng Dehuai as defense minister in 1959.  Beginning with the 
need to establish a more conventional military following the founding of the PRC in 1949, 
professionalization in step with military modernization became increasingly important.   
Lessons derived from the experience of the Chinese People's Volunteers (CPV) in the 
Korean Peninsula from 1950 to 1953 accelerated and confirmed the need to 
professionalize the PLA.  As the professionalization trend continued through the late 
1950s with rough alignment between the ruling elites of the CCP and the increasingly 
professional officers of the PLA, there evolved a gradual, but dramatic, shift in civil-
military relations that saw an increase in political control at the expense of continued 
professionalization of the armed forces. 
 As the effects of professionalization of the PLA came into conflict with its 
revolutionary roots and the implementation of Communist policy, a cleavage among the 
ruling elite began to emerge.  To understand the nature of this civil-military shift in China, 
it is necessary to understand the viewpoints and origins of the opposition to those 
favoring professionalization of the PLA.  While professionalism dominated the 
understanding of civil-military relations in China through 1959, factionalism among the 
ruling elite began emerging in the mid-1950s as professionalization conflicted with 
communist policy and the views of some of the revolutionary elite.  By the mid-1950s, 
Mao began urging the PLA to return to its guerrilla warfare roots and non-military 
activities to facilitate economic growth, which encountered resistance among those 
advocating a professionalized officer corps. 
 Exacerbating the tension between the professionalization trend and the 
revolutionary roots within the PLA were a confluence of international and domestic 
factors.  Internationally, the increasing tension in the Sino-Soviet relationship began 
encouraging a more independent and pragmatic vision by the CCP elite that eventually 
led to the implementation of a renewed "people's war" strategy.  Domestically, as the 
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Great Leap Forward (GLF) began to falter and economic ruin threatened the country, the 
ruling elite was forced to decide between the mutually exclusive directions of 
politicization or professionalization.  
 The importance of the resulting shift is to explore the ways in which the CCP 
affected a shift from professionalization to politicization of the PLA.  Understanding the 
organizational restructuring, political transformation, and policy changes is crucial to 
developing an answer as to how civil-military relations evolve.  Clearly visible was the 
reshuffling of the Party and PLA elite through Peng Dehuai's removal and subsequent 
replacement by Lin Biao in 1959.  At lower levels of the PLA the interlocking directorate 
was revamped to promote the resurgence of political concerns in the military apparatus 
through re-instituting the political control system of party committees, and strengthening 
the ability of the political commissars to penetrate the PLA.   
B. PROFESSIONALIZATION 
 With the founding of the PRC in 1949, it was imperative to transition the PLA 
from a guerrilla fighting force into a more conventional force capable of national defense 
and security.  Because of the shared background and nearly identical functions of the 
revolutionary CCP elite as both military commanders and political leaders, there was 
little distinction or difference in their political agenda or military views.33 Therefore, a 
largely unified effort bridging political and military concerns concentrated on military 
modernization of the PLA. 
 The initial efforts to craft a more modern military in the first years of the PRC 
were widely supported by the political elite.  In order to achieve a modern military force, 
it would be necessary to develop a highly skilled officer corps capable of managing the 
modern equipment. 34   Initially heeding Mao Zedong's call in 1950 for the PLA to 
modernize "on the basis of its existing foundations and through adopting the advanced 
experiences of the Soviet Union," the PLA began to professionalize.35  In 1950, the GPD 
                                                 
33 Ellis Joffe, Party and Army: Professionalism and Political Control in the Chinese Officer Corps 
1949–1964 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), 44. 
34 Ibid., 2. 
35 Communist China 1949–1959: Volume I (Hong Kong: Union Research Institute, 1961), 2. 
 17 
promptly established entrance requirements, guidelines, and length of school programs to 
achieve qualification within the PLA in the newly distinguished military specialties of 
naval, tank, aviation, artillery, and air defenses.36  By observing that the CCP leadership 
was united in pursuing both a modern and professional military, it becomes apparent that 
the effort to professionalize the PLA was not founded in opposition to the party, but was 
a result of the Party's direction. 
1. The Korean War 
 Through the first years of the PRC, the trend towards professionalization 
proceeded without encountering any major obstacles.  As the CPV confronted the UN 
forces on the Korean peninsula, shortcomings of the Chinese military were made readily 
apparent to the commander, Peng Dehuai.  A lack of a reliable logistic supply chain and 
the absence of Chinese air power compromised any advantage that CPV mobility and 
troop strength provided.  Realizing that modern weaponry could cripple any offensive 
effort by the technologically inferior CPV, PLA officers would seek to correct the PLA's 
inadequacy.37   
 Soviet support continued to provide military equipment while Soviet advisors 
helped organize the PLA into a modernized and professional fighting force. 38  
Domestically, the ruling elite of the CCP continued to advocate military modernization 
and recognized the need for professionalization of the PLA.  Zhu De echoed this 
sentiment in 1952 when advocating that PLA training concentrate on educating military 
members on the use of technical equipment to effectively operate the increasingly 
modern equipment of the newly established Army, Air Force, and Navy.39 
 By transforming the emphasis of training toward the technical proficiency within 
the PLA, a shift from the heavy political focus of a typical basic training day in the PLA 
would be required.  According to an interview gathered from a Chinese prisoner of war  
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during the Korean conflict, over five hours, or half of the productive day, were allocated 
for political indoctrination emphasizing Communist goals while no time was set aside for 
technical or professional training.40 
 By 1953, the concrete examples of China's modernization effort of the PLA had 
become visible.  Both the Navy and Air Force had been established, and the PLA had 
been transformed from an infantry army to a mechanized land force with both sea and air 
support.41  In order to keep pace with modern weapons and learn new tactics, the deputy 
director-general of the GPD, Hsiao Hua, advocated a continuous focus on tactical and 
technical training through a heavy emphasis on education of military science from the 
Soviet Union.42 
 After the Korean War, professionalization came to the forefront of priorities for 
the PLA.  Following the People's Daily article in 1954 that stressed that the central task 
of the PLA was on modernization and the training of the officer corps, two fundamental 
changes occurred which accelerated the professionalization of the PLA. 43   The 
Communist regime instituted compulsory military service in 1955 and it formally 
introduced the Military Service Law.44  Thus all male citizens at the age of eighteen were 
now required to enter military service, and a professional officer corps would be 
established to not only increase technical specialization, but also facilitate the training of 
the large numbers of conscripts.45 
 Together, these changes signaled an organizational shift from the "egalitarian, 
irregular, and informal guerrilla officer to the status-conscious, routinized, and 
formalized professional officer corps."46  Fields of specialization were established and 
officer ascension with an emphasis on technical and professional competence was 
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emphasized for advancement.  Notably, the regulations established a sequence of 
fourteen ranks in the officer corps and required officers to wear shoulder boards and 
insignia to display their rank.  The establishment of ranks promoted efficient organization 
and developed a professional officer corps capable of administering the large number of 
conscripts about to surge into the PLA as a result of the Military Service Law.  
Development of the professional officer corps also contributed to specialization and 
technical competence which translated into more capable management of the increasingly 
modernized equipment.47 
 Accompanying the change from an egalitarian to a stratified officer corps, the 
officers were allocated cash payments according to their rank to replace their previous 
food subsidy and small allowance. 48  Additionally the officer corps was functionally 
divided into classes of officers according to their professions.49  While these changes 
were not as transformative, they highlighted the degree to which policy formulated by the 
party elite was concentrated on the full transformation of the PLA to a professional force 
in the immediate aftermath of the Korean War. 
 As professionalization of the PLA served to strengthen the position of the military 
commander, the role of the political commissar was hindered by the lessons learned from 
experience in the Korean War.  Because the conflict was waged on foreign soil, 
commissars were unable to successfully mobilize the population because language and 
cultural differences between the CPV and civilian Korean population.  The barriers to 
communication prevented the commissars from establishing unity of effort, and as a 
result the PLA learned that in foreign wars, political commissars were ineffective in 
establishing a link between the army and society.  As a result, military commanders 
afforded less and less attention to the marginalized political commissars, thereby 
weakening their organizational position within the PLA.50 
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2. Continuing Professionalization 
 Through a gradual process of institutionalizing a professional officer corps in the 
military, the focus directed at the military's professional and technical education 
perpetuated professionalization after the momentum from the Korean War lessons 
subsided.  Therefore, General Peng Shaohui, deputy inspector-general of military training, 
advocated in 1956 for the expansion of professionalization of academic and technical 
studies through establishing research and training in military science while expanding 
scholarships for studies and postgraduate opportunities.  Ultimately, this direction would 
ensure a new and larger professional officer corps developed within the PLA.51 
 As education in the PLA forced the military academies to swell, the desire for 
increased professionalization became institutionalized by the military academies.  Thus, 
the emphasis of the president of the Academy of Military Sciences, established in 1958, 
continued to emphasize the latest scientific and technical developments through learning 
applicable lessons from the Soviet Union for use in the PLA's modernization.52 
 The important observation of professionalization after mid-1950 is to observe that 
the focus on education of the officer corps to professionalize persisted.   Additionally, as 
officers continued their military indoctrination that favored professionalization and 
modernization, the number of officers within the PLA with the same general outlook 
expanded as well.  While the number of officers that favored professionalization is 
unknown, the increasing amount of editorials directed at the less desirable side effects 
associated with the professionalization of the PLA indicate that it grew increasingly 
worrisome for the Communist elites. 
C. EMERGENCE OF FACTIONS 
 The main political schism that began emerging in the CCP elite formed on the 
debate centered on the correct tack for the CCP to pursue as it sought to build and 
strengthen the PRC.  On one hand, there were prominent members of the party elite that  
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favored development based on pragmatic, economic reforms.  However, these party 
reformers came in conflict with the remainder of the political elite that favored the 
building of socialism and socialist institutions prior to further economic progress.53 
 With the modernization and professionalization of the PLA formally underway in 
1955, there was an effort by the CCP leadership to begin curbing the effects of 
professionalization on the attitudes of the PLA officers.  Professionalization through the 
introduction of ranks, increased technical and professional education, and modernized 
equipment led PLA officers into developing attitudes that conflicted with those of the 
revolutionary elite that remained centered on CCP control of an egalitarian PLA.   
D. PROFESSIONALIZATION AFFECTING POLITICIZATION 
 As the officer corps transformed itself into a more modern and capable force, they 
began developing distinctly independent viewpoints from that of the traditional 
revolutionary elite that had brought the CCP into power. 54  The tension of military 
modernization was fairly subtle in that both the political elites and military officers 
sought professionalization and modernization as a priority, but the political views 
associated with the professionalized officer corps came to challenge the fundamental 
"doctrine, characteristics, and practices of the army."55 
 Professionalization advocates believed that modern warfare required a shift in 
emphasis from reliance on the revolutionary individual to dependence on modern 
machinery and weapons operated by trained professionals.  Conflicting with this view 
was the revolutionary elites concept of "people's war," which relied on mass mobilization 
and socialist and egalitarian principles to successfully conduct war.  In this struggle 
between the military professionals and party elite, the presence of a factional divide can 
be observed by mid-1950. 
 In 1955, the director of the GPD, Lo Ronghuan, accused PLA officers of 
abandoning "democracy," neglecting the practice of persuasion, and mistreating troops 
because the preferential treatment afforded to the officer corps had encouraged officers to 
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abandon the revolutionary way of thinking.56  This critique which can be generalized as 
abandoning democracy and the mass line in favor of professionalization and 
regularization of the PLA continued to be echoed by leaders of the PLA. 
 As a part of the anti-rightist campaign following the Hundred Flowers campaign, 
Mao's speech on the resolution of contradictions among the people set the tone for the 
1957 anti-dogmatism campaign that the GPD would subsequently adopt and formalize 
within the PLA.57  Coincidently, the PLA began to recognize the conflicting viewpoints 
of the revolutionary elite that emphasized political indoctrination with that of the 
professionalized PLA's bureaucratic self-interest.  Reactions against the professionalized 
officer corps that exhibited elements of bureaucratism, sectarianism, and subjectivism 
became more common from the PLA leadership.58 
 Notable reactions included the accusation by the deputy director of the GPD in 
1956 that officers were guilty of abusing soldiers, neglecting both democracy and the 
mass line, while favoring professionalization and emphasizing science and technology.59   
In the same year, the GPD began mandating that officers in the PLA take political and 
theoretical courses and instituted a political exam as a requirement for subsequent 
promotion.60  Additionally, Marshal Peng Dehuai, at the Eighth National Congress of the 
CCP in 1956, straddled the factional divide by stressing the need to raise political 
consciousness as well as technical ability of the commanders to be effective in modern 
warfare.61 
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E. EXTERNAL FACTORS 
1. Great Leap Forward 
 Adding to the factional divide between the professionalization and politicization 
of the PLA was the shift toward economic priorities over efforts to modernize the 
military.  In 1956, Mao directed the Chinese economy toward developing its industrial 
base prior to developing defense industries.62  Thus, the GLF deprived the PLA of the 
precious economic resources it needed to proceed on the path towards modernization.  As 
a result, the ensuing competition for resources between economic growth and military 
modernization exacerbated the already growing gap between the military professional 
viewpoint and the political direction of the CCP. 
 In order for the PLA to more effectively operate in civilian society, a return to the 
traditional role of the political commissar was required as the key liaison element 
between the civilian population and the military.  Therefore, as the importance of the 
political concerns strengthened the commissar's position relative to that of the political 
commander, the GLF's isolationist policies also helped the faction that favored 
politicization of the PLA over that of professionalization.63  Because of this internal 
disagreement on the basic orientation of the PLA that cut between both the Party and 
military elite, the Party elite was able to facilitate a return to political control of the PLA. 
2. Sino-Soviet Tensions 
 Individuals that favored professionalization of the officer corps to modernize the 
military gradually distanced themselves from an emphasis on politics or the masses from 
the revolutionary struggle.  However, the international context shifted from a Sino-Soviet 
partnership in the mid-1950s towards eventual isolation in the international environment 
and opposition to both of the superpowers.  Thus the political leadership was increasingly 
pressured to advocate policies of economic and military self-reliance. 
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 Economically, the realization that China would become internationally isolated 
motivated the GLF policies which mandated a greater effort on collectivization and 
political mobilization to produce growth.  The emphasis on advanced agricultural 
collectivization also fueled Sino-Soviet tensions as the Chinese economic development 
veered from the Soviet model of increased industrialization.  Militarily, a return to the 
"people's war" strategy was adopted as international support on the modernization effort 
was withdrawn.  The ensuing military strategy would rely on greater mobilization of the 
masses through a re-invigorated militia, while the PLA returned to its guerrilla roots of 
civic involvement. 
 In 1958, the Taiwan Strait crisis also helped drive a wedge between the PRC and 
the Soviet Union.  Shelling of the islands without Soviet consent was ultimately a test of 
Soviet commitment to the Sino-Soviet Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance.  As 
tensions rose between China and the Soviet Union, advocates of military professionalism 
were the most concerned.  Not only was access to military technology and equipment 
threatened, but there became a distinct possibility that China would be left without 
assistance in securing a nuclear weapon and lose its strategic ally that could provide a 
nuclear deterrent.64 
F. REVERSAL OF PROFESSIONALIZATION 
 Confronted with ineffective economic policies of the GLF and further political 
intrusions into the professionalization of the PLA, Peng Dehuai expressed his dissent at 
the Lushan plenum of the Central Committee in 1959.65  Because Peng's critique and 
viewpoint represented a critical attack on the party, he was accused of being against the 
Party and found guilty of "military professionalism."66  However, because his critique 
also mirrored the interests of the Soviet Union, Peng Dehuai's critique of the Party 
represented a much more damaging attack against the legitimacy of the CCP to govern 
China, and ultimately resulted in his removal as the Defense Minister. 
                                                 
64 Joffe, Party and Army, 101. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid., 103. 
 25 
 Because the professional trend in the military favored continued relations with the 
Soviet Union as a source of military science, technology, equipment, training, and 
possible nuclear exchange, the CCP elite was able to associate the professionalization of 
the military with the external antagonist.67  Thus the professional viewpoint came under 
increasing attack through published editorials that characterized the lure of Soviet 
influence as an abandonment of the CCP's rich revolutionary heritage.68 
 Following the removal of Peng Dehuai, Lin Biao gradually and systematically 
implemented reforms that re-politicized the PLA and derailed the professionalization of 
the PLA officer corps.  With modernization constrained by the international isolationism 
following the Sino-Soviet split, professionalization of the PLA was curtailed by policies 
instituted under Lin Biao that reorganized the PLA.  By enlarging the militia, expanding 
the interlocking directorate, increasing the relative power of the political commissars, and 
revamping PLA training and education, politicization of the PLA became the priority 
over professionalization.   
1. Expanding the Militia 
 As the PLA underwent professionalization, the role of the militia came under 
scrutiny.  The professional training of the PLA increased the discrepancy between 
regulars in the army and a militia that distracted from the PLA's effort to transform to a 
modern military and had little use in modern warfare.69  However, the maintenance of the 
militia symbolized the Party elite's "commitment to the principle that ultimately the 
defense of China rested on the people—not the technology and expertise of the military 
establishment."70 
 As the international context influenced Chinese military strategy at the end of the 
1950s into a self-reliant strategy of "people's war," the militia became a much more 
critical element to defense than the modernization of conventional forces.  In order to 
effectively integrate the militia within the PLA necessitated the resurgence of the political 
                                                 
67 Joffe, Party and Army, 109. 
68 Ibid., 109–110. 
69 Godwin, Development of the Chinese Armed Forces, 17. 
70 Ibid. 
 26 
commissar in the PLA as the link between the military and society. 71   Because 
commissars serve as the liaison between the local militias, the party and the army, they 
would necessarily become increasingly relevant in the strategic shift to "people's war."   
Lin Biao's disdain of the professional faction within the military that resisted non-military 
tasks such as the training of the militia or the participation in economic development 
prompted him to restructure the PLA and refocus political indoctrination to further 
strengthen the GPD and the role of the political commissar.72 
2. Interlocking Directorate 
While the interlocking directorate remained largely intact at the elite level, there 
was a purge among the professionalization faction among the elite and the Party 
Committee system was expanded to lower echelons in order to coordinate and direct 
political, military, and government activity.  At the elite level Lin Biao's ascendance to 
Defense Minister following the purge of Peng Dehuai was accompanied by the promotion 
of two former political commissars, Luo Ruiqing and Qiu Huizuo, to departments within 
the PLA.73  Shortly after becoming the Minister of National Defense, Lin then outlined 
his policy in September 1959, which would reconstruct party organization in the PLA, 
strengthen political education, and restore the lost connection between the army and the 
masses.74 
While political commissars were established within the PLA chain of command 
and designated as equal to the military commander, the "Party Committees were 
established 'outside' but parallel to the organizational structure of the Army."75  The 
purpose of this parallel organization was to strengthen military organization and ensure 
that the military operated in accordance with the CCP.  Additionally, the Party 
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Committee promoted solidarity, arbitrated disputes, and built consensus when needed.76  
However, the Party Committee System though parallel was not independent of the PLA 
organization.  The political commissar has typically served as a member of the committee 
and at lower echelons often occupied the role as the secretary general of the Party 
Committee.77 
 However, during the emphasis on professionalization, the Party Committee 
system had gradually fallen into disuse.  Not only had approximately 7,000 companies 
lacked party branch committees, the number of party members within the PLA had also 
declined.78  Thus, the political control system was not only neglected, but the decrease in 
Party members within the Army reduced the influence of the Party Committee system to 
influence the PLA.  Therefore, the expansion of the interlocking directorate to the lower 
levels of party and military bureaucracy allowed for the political leaders to influence the 
military and promote party policy.79 
 The web of command that weaves together the PLA chain of command among 
military commanders and political commissars also incorporates the parallel, but not 
separate Party Committee system hierarchy to produce an interlocking system at lower 
echelons. 80   At the provincial and district level, an increasing number of Party 
Committees formed an interlocking directorate that connected the party, army, and 
government.  While only the frontier regions possessed an interlocking directorate when 
Lin Biao became Defense Minister, all military regions were operating under an 
interlocking directorate at either the province or district level in 1973.81  
 Monte Bullard emphasized the expansion of the interlocking directorate between 
the party, army, and government to show the key institutional linkages in party-army 
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relations.82  From 1960 to 1973, the number of interlocking roles held by elites expanded 
from 122 in 1960 to 445 in 1973.83  As the interlocking directorate was expanded into 
each level, the top party representative would assume the top military position as the 
political commissar. 84   Thus, the CCP tightened political control through increasing 
political indoctrination and centralizing institutional control over the military through the 
concentration of the interlocking directorate at lower levels.85 
3. Role of the GPD 
In the 1950s, when Party and military elites were aligned in advocating 
professionalization, the GPD molded the PLA's military training and education to reflect 
this emphasis.  However, in the gradual shift towards politicization in the late 1950s, 
once again the GPD reflected the Party's demands and then began the politicization of the 
PLA.  In order to restore political control of the PLA, the political commissar would need 
to be strengthened relative to the military commander to promote and enforce Party 
policy.  While the role of the Party Committee remained important, the strength of the 
political commissar was crucial to bridge the PLA and Party direction disseminated 
through the parallel command chains.86  
 Though efforts to strengthen the role of political commissars were undertaken 
prior to Peng Dehuai's removal in 1959, PLA officers whose lingering interest in 
professionalization resisted adopting the political controls.87  However, replacing Peng 
Dehuai as an advocate for professionalization at the top of the PLA hierarchy while 
enhancing the political commissar's role through the deepened interlocking directorate 
encompassed by the party committee system, disrupted the PLA's ability to continue 
professionalization. 
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Additionally, the entrusting of personnel information and influence on the promotion 
process within the PLA provided the political commissar leverage to promote the Party 
line.88 
 Growing the number of sub-departments under the GPD also expanded the 
general influence of the GPD throughout the PLA.  Following the reorganization in 
1957–1958 the number of sub-departments under the GPD control increased to include 
the cadre, propaganda, security work, liaison, mass work, and the system of general 
secretaries.89  Of specific importance regarding influence now under the GPD's purview 
was the function of the general secretaries, cadre, and security departments.  General 
secretaries controlled the most sensitive of Party correspondence, while the cadre and 
security department allowed the surveillance of Party members by developing and 
maintaining dossiers of Party members within the PLA.90 
 Additionally, Lin Biao curtailed the power of the military commander through 
emphasizing development and training of the militia under the PLA's tutelage.  The 
political commissar, as liaison between society and military, thus continued to gain in 
importance relative to the military commander. 91   As Godwin states, "the political 
commissar would increase in significance because, in a strategy for protracted war, he is 
responsible for indoctrinating the soldiers, establishing a close working relationship with 
the regional forces and the militia and maintaining the continued support of the 
population over a long and brutal war."92  Thus, Lin Biao's restoration of the political 
committees and political commissar system established an active presence of the political 
control system and facilitated the integration of the PLA with society.93 
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4. PLA Training and Education 
 In the early 1950s the party elite promoted modernization and professionalization 
of the officer corps.  To accomplish this shift, leadership within the GPD actively 
promoted education that emphasized technical and professional training at the expense of 
political indoctrination.  However, in the subsequent shift away from professionalization, 
it was once again the GPD that directed change within the PLA.   
 Along with a greater role for the political commissar, the training for PLA troops 
began to incorporate greater amounts of political indoctrination.  By mandating study of 
political courses which corresponded to the individual officer's rank and a yearly 
examination to determine progress, political indoctrination was re-introduced to the 
existing officer corps, and institutionalized for future officer development.94  Thus the 
trend during the professionalization of the early 1950s that involved shifting greater 
portions of training to professional and technical tasks, was replaced with a political 
focus.  
 A clear example of the shift towards politicization was found in the PLA 
academies.  Because military academies were the stronghold of the notion of 
professionalization, they were targeted most directly to shift the PLA's focus away from 
its desire to professionalize.  The CCP controlled the political education of the entire 
PLA "to ensure the complete subservience and loyalty of their military arm to the dictates 
of the party high command." 95   Throughout the academies, military textbooks 
incorporated larger collections of Mao's writings and focused more attention on political 
development.96  Changing the curriculum in the academies would at once cease enlarging 
the pool of officers indoctrinated with the professionalization ethos and alter the views of 
subsequent military leaders. 
 Political commissars were also placed in training departments and courses 
alongside the military commanders.97  Then, following political training, both military 
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commanders and commissars would work side by side in the strengthened party 
committee system which would then allow for the political commissar to continue 
political indoctrination of soldiers.98  As the power of the political commissars surpassed 
that of the military commander, penetration of the ranks within the PLA became more 
and more prevalent. 
 By 1961, the precursor to the Little Red Book of Mao's writing had been 
published for political study within the PLA.99  Then in May 1961, the Central Military 
Commission published the "General Principles of the Combat Rules and Regulations of 
the Combined Force," which confirmed that man is the decisive factor in war against 
technologically modern weapons and equipment. 100   Thus, the CCP solidified the 
politicized nature of the PLA, and completed the reversal of the professionalization trend 
of the PLA. 
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III. CASE STUDY II: 1989 
A. OVERVIEW 
 Unlike the gradual shift from professionalization in the late 1950s, the shift from 
professionalization to re-politicization of the PLA that revolved around the infamous 
events at Tiananmen Square in 1989 came about quickly and lasted only briefly.   
Immediately following Deng Xiaoping's return and consolidation of power in 1977, the 
program for reform was promulgated.  With economic modernization taking top priority, 
modernization of the military was the last of the modernizations behind that of 
agriculture, industry, and science and technology.101  However, military reforms aimed at 
professionalizing the PLA were promptly adopted in order to facilitate the eventual 
military modernization. 
 The professionalization trend that was carried out through the 1980s largely 
displaced the political concerns that had been consistently fostered within the PLA 
throughout Mao's later years.  Similar to the politicization that occurred at the end of the 
1950s, the re-politicization of the PLA in 1989 largely resulted from a factional divide 
among both the party and military elite that was exacerbated by domestic and 
international factors that threatened the survivability of the communist regime. 
 Here again, the importance is to examine the mechanisms through which the Party 
used to re-orient the PLA from its focus on professionalization.  In 1989, similar 
measures to those used in the late 1950s were adopted through the same mechanisms that 
transmitted Party direction throughout the PLA.  Reshuffling of the party elite was 
accompanied by reinforcing a lower level interlocking directorate through deepening the 
party committee system and strengthening the role of the GPD.  Thus the changing 
emphasis of the CCP away from professionalism was able to penetrate and re-orient the 
military's focus away from a decade long commitment of military professionalization. 
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B. PROFESSIONALIZATION 
 With modernization as the motivation for Deng Xiaoping's reform agenda 
encompassing all aspects of the PRC, the low emphasis afforded to the military resulted 
from a lack of ability to modernize rather than accurately reflecting a desire to transition 
the PLA.  Economic, agricultural and science and technological modernization needed to 
precede military modernization to build a sufficiently strong economic base to commence 
military modernization.  However, professionalization of the military began immediately, 
albeit slowly, following the changing emphasis as advocated by the CCP elite and the 
PLA's poor performance in Vietnam in 1979.102  Similar to the inadequacy of the CPV 
during the Korean War, the PLA's involvement in a skirmish with Vietnam highlighted 
significant problems in the way that the military was managed.103  After identifying PLA 
weakness in combat readiness, overstaffing of the military leadership, and lack of suitable 
training, Deng initiated his effort to reform the military into a more professional and 
effective organization prior to committing to military modernization.104 
 Early efforts to begin the process of reforming the PLA in the Deng era involved 
establishing a military court system in 1979 and drafting new military regulations and 
conscription laws throughout the 1980s. 105   However, the more significant reforms 
initiated by the CCP in the Deng era that clearly indicated the shift in emphasis towards 
professionalization of the PLA were the re-introduction of ranks, a new service law 
outlining promotion criteria, and the institutionalization of forced retirements. 
 Since the expanded meeting of the Central Military Commission in 1985, PLA 
modernization and professionalization became the primary focus of the CCP elite.106  
Reinstituting military ranks and codifying the division between officer and enlisted 
troops was itself a major shift towards professionalization and allowed for additional 
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reforms to further professionalize the military.  Similar to the introduction of ranks in 
1955, the military hierarchy promoted efficient organization capable of better managing 
the military which once again shifted the inter-military relationship from its egalitarian 
origin. 
 Additionally, in 1985, the regulations governing retirement entitled "Regulations 
for Military Service of Active Duty Officers of the Chinese People's Liberation Army" 
were developed in synch with the re-instatement of military ranks.  In this regulation, age 
limits depending on military rank established a mandatory retirement age throughout the 
PLA while defining an absolute maximum of 30 years of service.107  By limiting the 
length of service of military officers along with an overall troop reduction of one million 
soldiers, military officers that were promoted through the ranks as a result of the earlier 
politicization efforts by the CCP were gradually phased out.108 
 It is important to remember, however, that the establishment of these new policies 
did not produce immediate effects.  Though Deng was considered a paramount leader of 
the PRC, these regulations still met with resistance and were only slowly implementation 
throughout the PLA.109  Equally important to notice is that the consistency of the effort 
by the Party elite to alter the orientation of the PLA into a more professional military 
gradually succeeded.  For example, the retirement norm, while only slowly becoming 
adopted, still had the effect of lowering the average age of officers by 1986.110 
 Changes in military education and training also aided the PLA's return to a 
professional orientation at the urging of Deng's 1977 Speech "The Army Should Attach 
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linked education level of the troops in the PLA with future promotions.  To overcome any 
opposition within the PLA, Deng utilized the GPD to ensure that education would weight 
as heavily as performance when considering promotions and assignments.112 
 Professional military education had also improved throughout the 1980s by first 
recruiting better qualified members, and then concentrating education on technical and 
military issues rather than politically motivated subjects.113  By 1984, officer recruits for 
the PLA were sought from recent graduates of colleges or technical academies.  
Additionally in 1984, the military academies of the PLA would be combined to form the 
NDU in an effort to provide a more comprehensive education and training program for 
senior officers. 114   The professional orientation of PLA training was then further 
reinforced by the contact with foreign militaries as more and more countries normalized 
relations and the PRC gradually improved its international relations.115  Cumulatively, 
the professionalization of the PLA training and education system resulted in 58% of 
military elites with tertiary education by 1988, which is a dramatic improvement of the 
dismal 4% of military elites with an equivalent education in 1982.116 
C. EMERGENCE OF FACTIONS 
 Among the Party elite, a general consensus was built around the effort to 
modernize the PRC's economy, agriculture, science and technology, and defense sectors.   
However, the democracy protests in December 1986 represented a threat to regime 
stability and instigated the CCP to initiate a campaign against "bourgeois 
liberalization."117  In response to the movement for increased democracy, members in the 
Party elite were gradually forced to determine their own views on whether to continue  
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supporting the modernization efforts that had inadvertently led to the popular demands 
for change within the government or to revert to a more communist orientation in order to 
preserve regime stability. 
 Evidence of factional struggle within the Party became apparent in the details of 
the 1988 attempt to control inflation in the PRC.  Deng, with the support of liberal 
reformers Zhao Ziyang, Hu Yaobang, and Wan Li, proposed a price and wage plan to 
adjust the two tiered pricing system in order to control inflation.  However, through a 
bargaining process to reach consensual support, the Politboro ultimately signed on to a 
conservative economic program and rejected Deng Xiaoping's more liberal proposal.  In 
essence, the final result of the effort to combat inflation eluded to a disagreement within 
the Party elite on whether to continue an agenda of reforms to achieve modernization.118 
 This dilemma equally permeated the ranks of the PLA, thus forming a cleavage 
that similarly divided both the PLA and Party leadership.  On the one hand, PLA officers 
that began to favor professionalization at the exclusion of politicization aligned with the 
liberal political elite that desired to continue the reforms that had begun professionalizing 
and modernizing the PLA.  Thus, professionalization of the military corresponded with 
Party elite that advocated a continuation of the reform era.119  On the other hand, hard-
liners within the Party elite that were inclined to abandon or suspend reform efforts in 
order to secure the political regime corresponded with those within the PLA that either 
valued the Party above all else or envisioned a strong political regime as a requirement 
for the overall health of the military.  Therefore, the party officials that resisted the 
reform agenda also favored a shift away from professionalization within the PLA and 
were more closely aligned with military members that favored re-politicization to 
strengthen the political orientation of the PLA.  
D. PROFESSIONALIZATION AFFECTING POLITICIZATION 
 Increased professionalism within the PLA, through the restoration of military 
ranks, instituting mandatory retirement thresholds and focus on professional military 
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education also provided less interference from ideological persuasion. 120   James 
Mulvenon highlights the fact that any career path in the PLA that involved political work 
quickly fell out of the competition to promote while military only career tracks gained an 
advantage.121  Thus, as in the case of increased professionalization in the early 1950s, the 
relative balance between the military commander and political commissar slowly shifted 
in favor of the former. 
 However, it is important to remember that professionalization did not occur in 
absence of political indoctrination.  As courses in the military academies turned its 
educational focus towards professionalization, politicization was not completely 
abandoned.  The Director of the GPD continued to call attention to the usefulness of 
political education in conjunction with military affairs and technical training.122  The 
decrease in political careers may reflect the blending of political influence into 
professional military jobs, but not that political influence has been completely displaced 
as professionalization progressed throughout the 1980s and 1990s.  The point is that the 
evolving curriculum and general professionalization of the PLA shifted the balance in 
favor of professionalization, but did not completely abandon political indoctrination. 
 The emphasis of "people's war" guided China's development from the Sino-Soviet 
split in the late 1950s until 1985 when Deng Xiaoping reformulated China's strategic 
environment.  Reflecting on the fact that China was unlikely to be subject by an attack 
from either the U.S. or Soviet Union, the Party directed the PLA to focus on fighting 
local, limited wars along its periphery with a smaller, quicker, modernized, and more 
professional force.123  As the PRC's defense strategy evolved away from "people's war" 
to focus on local limited wars in the border regions, or in close proximity in the case of 
Taiwan, the military became increasingly isolated from political involvement.  No longer 
was the PRC as reliant on large standing armies and direct support from local civilians as 
in the "people's war" concept that sought to lure the enemy deep within China to utilize 
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superiority of a guerrilla force on its own soil.  Thus the increased independence from the 
militia decreased the roles and responsibilities of the political commissar and further 
strengthened the relative power of the military commander. 
 The balance with politicization of the armed forces was upset as professionalism 
became increasingly emphasized, and the PLA became increasingly distant from the 
CCP.124  The focus on external enemies and a commitment to the modernization and 
professionalization of the military inculcated the notion within some Party elites that the 
PLA should disengage even further from the political arena.125 
E. EXTERNAL FACTORS 
 Following President Richard Nixon's visit in 1972, the world began warming to 
the PRC.  In the 1980s, the push towards modernization of Chinese society, under the 
steerage of the CCP, continued to make significant inroads in international cooperation.  
At the time of the Tiananmen Square uprising, two significant international events were 
scheduled in China that would help facilitate a more involved role for China in the 
international community.  The Asian Development Bank was looking to begin its first 
meeting on Chinese territory and, more importantly, the first Sino-Soviet summit in 30 
years was scheduled to occur.126 
 However, the gradual changes within the Soviet Union towards reform in its own 
political system presented a critical dilemma for the CCP.  The focus on modernization of 
various sectors within China had paved the way for friendlier relations with its once 
adversarial neighbor, but employing the military to settle domestic unrest at Tiananmen 
would undermine international opinion on the CCP's legitimacy, strength, and 
commitment to modernization. 
 The CCP response to the PLA's vacillation to the Tiananmen uprising was 
particularly forceful because of the volatile international context in which it occurred.  
Indications that communist regimes in Eastern Europe may be evicted from power by the 
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military in Poland, Hungary, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Romania caused the 
CCP to fear for its political survival.  With the constant reminders of the rising military 
opposition to Communist regimes in Eastern Europe, the CCP was provided the 
motivation to reprioritize professionalization of the PLA behind that of politicization to 
ensure the PLA remained loyal to the Party.127 
F. REVERSAL OF PROFESSIONALIZATION 
 While the emergence of factions within the CCP was evident when scrutinizing 
Party politics in 1988, the events of Tiananmen Square in 1989 brought the division 
within the Party elite into the forefront.  Zhao Ziyang, Yan Jiaqi and Su Shaozhi formed a 
small yet powerful faction of the Party elite that advocated political reforms in addition to 
the pursuit of liberal modernization policies.  While the overall consensus among the 
Party elite was to resist any pressure to compromise and adopt a hard-line response 
opposed to the civil unrest, Zhao Ziyang reached out to the protestors to find a 
solution. 128   Unlike the nuanced evidence of a faction in 1988 on how to confront 
inflation, the factional divide was now clearly visible to both a wide domestic and 
international audience.  What made the political faction particularly divisive is that within 
the PLA, it was logical to assume that some military professionals would be sympathetic 
to politicians that sought to continue an emphasis on reform that had already begun 
professionalizing and modernizing the military.  Additionally, the liberal reforms had 
been welcomed by the West and exposed an opportunity for foreign influence of the 
factional split within the Party. 
 The hesitation with which the PLA responded to the political direction from the 
political elite indicated a critical challenge to the Party's political authority.  Evidence 
that there were at least some individuals that preferred a professional and depoliticized 
military is found in the prosecution of military personnel in conjunction with the incident.   
Approximately 1,000 military members participated in the protest on 16 May while 
another 100 naval cadets participated in full uniform on 23 May. 129  It was finally 
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reported that 110 officers and 1,400 troops had failed to obey orders from the CCP in the 
Tiananmen Square incident.130  In particular, Xu Qinxian, commander of the 38th Army, 
was court-martialed for his delayed response to the Party's order to impose martial 
law.131 
 While the PLA, in general, remained loyal to the party line, the hesitation in 
following the Party's direction lessened the degree to which the Party could trust the 
PLA's loyalty and exposed a factional cleavage that cut across both the Party and military 
elite.  Therefore, a response by the hard-liners in the Party elite would necessarily be a 
significant and immediate shift in civil-military relations with a significant impact on the 
professionalization of the PLA.  Similar to the mechanisms employed in affecting a shift 
from professionalization in the late 1950s, the Party sought to re-orient the PLA through 
expanding the interlocking directorate, increasing the relative power of the political 
commissars, and revamping PLA training and education.   
1. Interlocking Directorate 
 The interlocking directorate had characterized the earlier days of the CCP in 
which there was a fusion between the civilian and military elite through their shared 
experiences of revolutionary struggle. However, this powerful cohesive bond had been 
largely disabled by the retirement of veteran political and military leaders that were 
subject to the reforms that established upper age limits depending on rank, or simply a 
matter of the individual's age.132 
 While the interlocking directorate may be largely disabled because of the relative 
disappearance of the revolutionary elite with both political and military roots, the 
interlocking directorate remained applicable in several other key areas.  At the elite level, 
Deng Xiaoping remained atop both the political and military organizations and his 
revolutionary experience was divided among military experience as a political commissar 
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and as a member of the Party elite.  Evidence that the interlocking directorate persisted 
after 1980 is also seen in the positions held by Wang Ruilin, a longtime friend and 
associate of Deng Xiaoping.  In 1983 Wang Ruilin was deputy director of the CCP 
general office and since 1990 has served as head of the PLA's Discipline Inspection 
Commission (DIC).133  Additionally, Wang Zhen, the PRC's vice president at the time of 
the Tiananmen Square incident originated from a military background.134  And, Yang 
Shangkun, who sat as the national President and secretary general of the CMC also 
occupied the leadership role of the entire PLA. 
 Functioning in place of the weakened interlocking directorate at the elite level 
were several policies and institutional linkages that prevented a dislocation of the PLA 
from the Party.  PLA elite and all officers at the rank of Colonel and above were still 
required to be members of the CCP.135  The Party Committee system continued to ensure 
that political aims be incorporated within the military in the lower echelons as the 
interlocking directorate permeated the PLA command structure.  Where individuals of the 
revolutionary elite constituted a leader in the PRC that was also politically reliable, the 
Party Committee system could ensure that the PLA command structure reflected 
appropriate political goals.  Whether or not this mechanism could perform its function 
then depended on the relative strength of the members.  As Party goals alternated 
between an emphasis on professionalism and politicization, the relative importance of the 
various players would fluctuate accordingly.  Therefore, during the professionalization 
trend, military commanders would have considerable influence in the Party Committees. 
 Another way in which the interlocking directorate could breakdown, but still 
ensure politically resolute leaders is to purge the civilian and military leaders that had 
demonstrated a lack of political trustworthiness.  Indeed, there were a significant number 
of top civilian and military leaders purged in the wake of the Tiananmen incident.  
Among the civilians that were affected, members of the party elite that had advocated 
that the PLA be depoliticized, such as Zhao Ziyang, Yan Jiaqi and Su Shaozhi, were 
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purged. 136  Additionally, the head of the Central Leading Group on Propaganda and 
Ideological Work, the bureaucratic pinnacle of the Party's massive propaganda system, 
Hu Qiuli was relieved in the wake of the crisis unfolding in Tiananmen Square in 
1989.137 
 Within the PLA, Yang Shangkun's trust-worthy half-brother, Yang Baibing, who 
was recently appointed head of the GPD during initial signs of unrest in 1987 oversaw a 
reconfiguration of the military leadership.138  This close relationship between the civil 
and military leadership strongly resembled the multiple roles performed by the 
revolutionary elite that had performed political and military roles in the interlocking 
directorate.  Throughout the leadership ranks, there were a significant number of 
promotions of politically trustworthy individuals with experience in the GPD and among 
those involved in the implementation of martial law in response to the unrest at 
Tiananmen Square.139 
 Then, to bolster the stature and power associated with the politically appointed 
officers, there were consistent rotations within the PLA to undermine any regional or 
personal support for military commanders.  In the military regions and military districts, 
there was a large reshuffling of military commanders and commissars to delink military 
officers from local power bases.  Of the seven military districts, six commanders and 
commissars were reshuffled.140  Additionally, PLA commissars and military officers that 
favorably viewed the Party's use of the PLA at Tiananmen were then more likely 
promoted in the subsequent shakeup of the PLA.  Thus, a new politically reliable 
leadership in the PLA was quickly set in place following June 1989. 
 Any agreement with the general observation that the interlocking directorate at 
the elite level had begun losing explanatory power is only marginally important in 
analyzing the shift in civil-military relations.  While the older revolutionary elite could be 
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reasonably seen as politically reliable, the replacement of top level officials within the 
Party and the PLA with politically reliable individuals substituted in for the role 
previously fulfilled through the interlocking directorate.  Additionally, the Party 
Committee system institutionalized political involvement at lower command echelons of 
the PLA.  To understand whether political goals were affectively transmitted to the PLA, 
it is necessary to examine the role of the GPD, especially the political commissars and 
PLA education and training. 
2. Role of the GPD 
 Rather than a gradual change that shifted the viewpoint of the military officer to 
favor professionalization over the party line, the hesitation with which the PLA 
responded to the party leadership's command to suppress the civil unrest in Tiananmen 
Square instantly showed the CCP elite the degree in which professionalization had 
distanced the PLA from the Party.  To counter the limited degree of military autonomy, 
the CCP politicization once again relied on a strengthened GPD and an expansion of the 
party committee system to ensure political considerations disseminated through education, 
training, and propaganda were thoroughly accepted. 
 The CCP prioritized the expansion of the parallel, but separate, Party Committee 
system to lower command echelons and strengthened the Committee's ability to monitor 
and report on the PLA's adherence to Party policy.141  As an organizational element 
responsible for political indoctrination of the PLA, the strengthened Party Committee was 
able to implement the indoctrination program directed by the head of the GPD, Yang 
Baibing.142  With membership that spanned local party leaders, the political commissar 
and military commander, the Party Committee system was thus the critical mechanism 
for political control where Party direction converged from both civilian and military 
channels. 
 To strengthen the GPD it would be necessary to bolster its capabilities and stature 
throughout the PLA.  The introduction of the Discipline Inspection Committee under the 
                                                 
141 Shambaugh, Modernizing China's Military, 132. 
142 Ibid., 133. 
 45 
GPD combined with the GPD's influence on officer promotions provided the political 
commissar with the resources to ensure and enforce political reliability of the PLA.143  
Furthermore, the political commissar and party committee system, as the traditional tools 
of Party indoctrination, education, and surveillance were strengthened and enlarged to 
ensure continued loyalty of the PLA as an ideologically stable ally of the communist 
regime. 144   Additionally, the GPD was relatively strengthened by dissolving other 
sources of power within the PLA.  As discussed in the interlocking directorate section, 
the appointment of GPD personnel to various leadership roles in other departments within 
the PLA along with the shuffling of military commanders among the military regions and 
districts undercut any personal or regional power bases of all military commanders. 
 In the immediate aftermath of Tiananmen, the PLA was required to police its own 
ranks, and investigate instances of insubordination.  Thus the Discipline Inspection 
Commission and the system of military courts, both under the organization of the GPD 
were tasked to respond to the leadership's demands to root out the sources of 
insubordination.145  According to Yang Baibing, the DIC and GPD had identified 111 
officers and 1,400 troops that were implicated in these investigations for breaching 
military discipline.146   Because the GPD was assigned the role of internal investigator of 
military commanders, the conflict between political and professional interests within the 
PLA was resuscitated.  The GPD and by extension the political commissar, through the 
investigation by the DIC, gained in relative power to the professional military 
commander.   
 The role of the political commissar was continually emphasized along with the 
deepening of the party committee system to quickly and completely re-politicize the 
PLA.147  At the All-Army Political Work Conference, six months after Tiananmen, Yang 
Baibing stressed that the role of the PLA was to confront any sign of "peaceful evolution" 
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that would pull the PRC away from its socialist direction.148  This heavy political bent 
would infiltrate the ranks through an intensive propaganda campaign facilitated by the 
strengthened control mechanisms of the Party Committee system, Discipline Inspection 
Committee, and the political commissar. Thus the CCP was able to quickly and 
dramatically halt the trend towards increased professionalization in the PLA.149 
 On more than one occasion, the CCP has adapted the role of the GPD and Party 
Committee system to match the direction of the political leadership.  In the late 1950s and 
in the aftermath of the Tiananmen crisis, when politicization of the PLA was desired, the 
political commissar was strengthened and the party committee system rejuvenated.  And 
since Tiananmen, the Party elites have persistently reinforcement the political commissar 
and party committee system to ensure the PLA remain politically reliable.150 
3. PLA Training and Education 
 Organizationally, training and education in the PLA remains the responsibility of 
the GPD.  Following Tiananmen, the nature of military education shifted from its 
professional focus on technical training to an emphasis on political education among the 
ranks of the PLA.  Half of every work week would be spent in political study to ensure 
adequate time is afforded for the studying the onslaught of political indoctrination.151  
Reflecting the shift away from professionalization, the major theme of the subsequent 
education and indoctrination campaigns was now focused on the 'absolute leadership' of 
the Party over the army.152  Lei Feng, the model soldier that embodied the desirable 
degree of political indoctrination within a soldier was brought back out as an example for 
all of the PLA to emulate.  While this image of Lei Feng is not a new one, his re-
appearance illustrates the politicization effort of the PLA.153 
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 Propaganda directed at the PLA focused on restoring discipline, ensuring CCP 
control over the PLA, resisting "peaceful evolution" and "bourgeois liberalization," and 
improving political work in lower echelons.154  Training and education programs re-
emphasized political education and the value of political work.  Beginning with higher 
command elements, and then filte`ring down to lower command echelons, political study 
sessions were required from two to three times a week for the military members or 
approximately half a work week.155 
 Contrary to the advocates of professionalization that had encouraged the PLA to 
disengage from politics, articles in the Liberation Army Daily took aim at this line of 
thought and associated the desire for an apolitical military to a plot to overthrow the 
Communist regime.156  In response to the collapse of Communist regimes in Europe, the 
CCP stressed that the PLA should instead draw closer to the Party and function as the 
vanguard against any peaceful evolution that would undermine the Party's authority.  An 
editorial following the Tiananmen incident on National Day repeatedly stressed the 
"party's absolute leadership over the army" because of the need of the military to support 
the CCP against any elements that wish to undermine the Party's authority.157  Tellingly, 
within the same editorial, no consideration was given to military modernization or to the 
professionalization of the PLA.  Thus, the shift from the long running effort to 
professionalize and modernize the PLA since the late 1970's had encountered a complete, 
and unbalanced, reversal to the professionalization trend.158 
 Among the overall effort towards professionalization of the PLA from the late 
1970s, "the re-politicization campaigns following Tiananmen were an anomaly in this 
trend, but they were largely completed by January 1990. After that date, and especially in 
response to the U.S. military display in the 1991 Gulf War, professional themes once 
again balanced political themes in the military media and political study, and the normal 
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training cycle was resumed."159  However, as the military continues to become a more 
professional force, lessons derived from the significant injection of political control in 
this period show that "ideological pressures, political involvement, leadership conflicts, 
and intra-army frictions" have substantially impeded progress in professionalizing the 
military.160 
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 There were many similarities between the two case studies, each of which focused 
on political interruptions of the well established efforts to professionalize the military.  
Separated by approximately three decades from each other, these case studies are 
connected by the general trend that shows a commitment to professionalization, the 
emergence of factions in a dynamic international and domestic environment, and a 
subsequent injection of political control over the PLA that disrupted the general trend 
towards professionalization.   
 In the early 1950s and the 1980s, Party leadership was committed to 
professionalization.  However, as professionalism became readily adopted by the officer 
corps, changes in international and domestic environment facilitated the formation of 
cleavages within the political elite.  The confluence of additional factors derived from 
both the internal and external environment disproportionately and unevenly affected the 
attitudes of the Party elites.  In 1959, the domestic economic failure of the GLF combined 
with increased Sino-Soviet tensions to fragment the political elite.  Similarly, the 
domestic political turmoil in 1989, set amongst the political changes in the Soviet Union 
and challenges to the Communist regimes of Eastern Europe, divided the political elite.  
Because the pursuit of professionalization and modernization of the military served the 
military's purpose, changes among the political elite were divisive among the military. 
 In both case studies, the Party resorted to the institutional mechanisms to ensure 
political control and ultimately, loyalty to the Party.  Through the parallel, but separate 
political control mechanisms of the party committee system, and the political commissar 
system, the CCP was able to penetrate the military command structure down to the 






professional military, their institutional integrity and relative power to influence the 
military commander decreased as professionalization was emphasized throughout the 
PLA.161 
 By strengthening and expanding the party committee system and political 
commissar system, the Party was effective in re-politicizing the military and lessening the 
priority of professionalization.  Re-establishing the party committee system at each 
command echelon and ensuring a political commissar was attached as co-commander 
restored institutional integrity.  Expanding the role of the GPD through consolidation in 
1959 and founding the Discipline Inspection Commission prior to the 1989 events 
provided punitive and manipulative powers for the commissars and Party representatives 
to politicize the military.  While strengthening the Party's control, purges among the elite, 
forced retirements, occupational rotations to disrupt informal sources of power were used 
to weaken any resistance to the shifting emphasis. 
 The GPD and political commissars have consistently been important in shaping 
the PLA.  The training and education programs along with promotion criteria have been 
instrumental in both professionalizing and politicizing the military.  As the Party shifted 
its emphasis in both case studies, a bolstering of the Party's control mechanisms was 
needed to overcome any resistance within the military.  Thus the ability to shift the 
emphasis away from professionalization required a shift in relative power away from that 
of the professional officer. 
B. PROFESSIONALIZATION 
 Since 1991–1992, there has been a consistent commitment to both military 
modernization and professionalization.  Contemporary analysis has begun to connect the 
growing body of laws and regulations governing the PLA as constituting the grounds on 
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army-state relations. 162   However, it remains critical to avoid confusing 
professionalization of the PLA with a transition towards objective civilian control or to 
anticipate the emergence of a de-politicized PLA. 
 Using the terminology of Samuel Huntington, the “client” of the PLA will remain 
the Party, and the military will not be able to shift to objective civilian control as long as 
the PRC's political system is dominated by one Party.  Additionally, the institutional 
mechanisms that encourage professional development are also the mechanism by which 
the Party is able to provide the political direction of the PLA.  In both case studies, it was 
shown that the GPD may be used to either enhance or reverse any effort to 
professionalize the PLA.  Thus, the existence of the GPD and the ability to reinvigorate 
the political commissar along with the party committee system will undermine any 
argument that China is moving toward objective civilian control.  As a result, the PLA 
will remain governed by subjective civilian control in spite of the current advances made 
towards professionalization over the last two decades.163 
 As advanced by Perlmutter and LeoGrande, and endorsed by James Mulvenon, 
the PLA is also unlikely to withdraw from politics. 164  Thus, at the elite level, the 
leadership of the PLA is likely to remain invested in political developments and relevant 
policy areas.  Additionally, while professionalization has increased, the tie to the political 
system through the GPD and political commissar has not been removed.  As in the 
previous instances of professionalization, the role of the political commissar has lost its 
influence relative to the military commander.  However, should a re-assertion of party 
control be necessary, it is reasonable to expect that the GPD will once again be tasked to 
facilitate a re-orientation of the PLA through cooperation and mutual support with the 
Party Committee system. 
                                                 
162 Shambaugh, "Civil-Military Relations in China," 16, and Scobell, "China's Evolving Civil-Military 
Relations," 232–234. 
163 Mulvenon, Professionalization of the Senior Chinese Officer Corps, 73. 
164 Ibid., 76. 
 52 
C. IMPLICATIONS 
 While professionalism and increasing institutional dependence in the PLA can 
indicate levels of stability and military effectiveness, the driver for substantial changes in 
civil-military relations will likely be derived from political fragmentation and a 
confluence of factors that could divide the Communist Party.  In the 1950s, the political 
faction that favored reform and modernization resonated with members of the PLA that 
advocated increasing levels of professionalism.  Because the desire for modernization and 
professionalization was sympathetic to Soviet interests and favored continued Soviet 
interaction, the opposing faction was compelled to reverse the emphasis of 
professionalization as the PRC's international ties were severed.  Likewise, in 1989, the 
economic liberals that advocated reform and political conciliation were aligned with 
those in the PLA that valued professionalization of the PLA.  Thus, the dominant political 
faction undermined professionalism within the PLA while confronting the liberal political 
faction in order to ensure the PLA remained loyal as China faced international isolation.  
 As the previous case studies demonstrated, the emergence of factions among the 
secretive Party elite has been subtle and difficult to identify.  Therefore, it is important to 
examine possible indicators of factional struggle, especially as the CCP is preparing for a 
significant political re-arrangement.  Studies that examine possible and potential elite 
fragmentation often have difficulty reaching conclusive results. 165   However, 
investigations asking whether the princelings constitute a coherent faction with distinct 
and possibly confrontational viewpoints or examining the removal of Bo Xilai as 
Chongqing Party secretary may become increasingly relevant. 
 Incorporating significant international and domestic factors are equally important 
in contemporary civil-military relations analysis in the PRC.  A shifting geo-political or 
security environment may be a catalyst of another evolution in civil-military affairs that 
once again interrupts the professionalization trend in the PRC.  Alternatively, a 
significant change in China's economic development may be the precursor for a civil-
military change should a decline in economic growth rates force the Party elite to make 
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difficult decisions on the budget.  Without knowing which kind of change is needed, it 
remains important to accurately assess changes in the international and domestic 
environment that could potentially affect future professionalization. 
 With the institutional mechanisms of the Party Committee system and political 
commissar, the CCP remains capable of implementing drastic change in civil-military 
relations.  Should external factors bring about or exacerbate factional politics among the 
ruling elite that are also reflected within the PLA, the Party will likely try to re-politicize 
the military to ensure its loyalty.  Should this occur, the constant drum beat offered by top 
Party officials that emphasize the PLA as owing its ultimate loyalty to the Party will 
become more than a slogan. 
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